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Quantitative discursive institutionalism: a comparison of labour market 
policy discourse across Western Europe 
 
Bruno Wueest and Flavia Fossati 
 
ABSTRACT Calls for more generalizable empirical examinations rank among the top priorities of discursive 
institutionalists. However, there are hardly any approaches that address the specific challenges of such 
examinations with regard to the systematic comparison of public discourses across countries. This contribution 
first develops a methodological framework for a comprehensive study of public discourse and subsequently 
applies it to study labour market policy discourse in six Western European countries from 2004 until 2006. 
Subsequently, the frame analysis shows that ideas brought forward in these public discourses relate to the three 
major concepts identified by the comparative political economy literature: corporatism, neoliberalism and 
compensation. Furthermore, the findings corroborate the expectations derived from the discursive institutionalist 
literature, since the salience of the frames does systematically vary according to the institutional legacies of the 
countries as well as to the interests of the actors involved. 
KEY WORDS Compensation; corporatism; discursive institutionalism; frame analysis; labour market policy; 
neoliberalism.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
For at least three decades scholars have been ‘bringing ideas back in’ to political science 
(Lieberman 2002: 697). Thus discursive institutionalist1 approaches, which rely on a 
combination of theories on ideational processes with arguments based on the neo-
institutionalism school, recently have gained considerable importance (see Schmidt [2008] 
and [2011]). One of the most important advantages of this discursive institutionalist literature 
is that it provides a clear conceptual framework to systematically compare both incremental 
and radical policy change across countries. However, despite the undisputed merits of these 
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studies, their empirical research strategies rarely go beyond qualitative case study analysis. In 
fact, the state of the art in discursive institutionalist studies is to analyse particular discourses 
in the context of specific reforms or events, whether in parliamentary debates (Smith and Hay 
2008), party politics (Ross 2000a; Crespy 2010), governments (Cox 2001), or selected parts 
of civil society like experts or grassroots movements (Anderson 2008; Goodin and Dryzek 
2006). We are thus able to learn how and why discursive actions alter the course of particular 
policy processes or how specific discourses relate to long-standing institutional variations 
between countries. However, although these contributions are theoretically insightful and 
empirically rich, their focus on a narrow set of actors and countries always faces the necessity 
to justify why their cases provide especially helpful evidence and do not just represent 
idiosyncratic evidence. 
 What the previous literature leaves open is whether it can be shown that discourse 
interacts with the institutional context also in a systematically comparative way. Hence, 
focusing on specific vehicles of specific discourses – as for instance parliamentary floor 
debates – might not allow analysis of their implications on everyday politics. On these 
grounds, recent accounts in the state of the discursive institutionalist literature forcefully call 
for a departure from the typical approach and demand more comprehensive and quantitative 
studies (e.g. Béland and Cox 2011: 697; Schmidt 2008). This article tries to accommodate this 
demand by proposing an approach that allows a systematic comparative analysis in line with 
discursive institutionalism. More precisely, the present contribution draws on conceptual 
ideas and methodological considerations from the literature on quantitative content analyses 
to develop an approach that allows the role of institutions, interests and ideas in mediatized 
discourse to be analysed (see Wueest 2013). Of course, there are already numerous 
approaches that deal with the challenges of systematically comparing discourse across 
countries; the most notable examples include the ‘critical discourse analysis’ (van Dijk 2000), 
but also the ‘discourse network’ approach as suggested by Leifeld and Haunss (2012), the 
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‘discourse quality index’ developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003) and the ‘discourse 
opportunity structure’ framework used by Ferree et al. (2002). However, none of these 
approaches is directly related to the tenets of the neo-institutionalist literature. 
Accordingly, this study tries to map discourse in a more encompassing way. To 
demonstrate the adequacy of the analytical approach presented here, it is applied to map the 
discourse on labour market policies in quality newspapers of six Western European countries 
(France, Germany, UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria) from 2004 until 2006. By 
analysing more than 2500 frames, the results provide systematic evidence that three major 
ideas structure the mediatized discourse on labour market policies in Western Europe: 
corporatist, neoliberal, and compensation frames. The salience of these ideas in mediatized 
discourses, in turn, shows a systematic relationship with politics, i.e. the actors’ perceived 
labour market policy interests, as well as the institutional legacies of the countries under 
concern. Further analyses show that the time-specific reform pressure, manifest in specific 
political constellations, plays a role in the variation in the framing patterns as well. In sum, 
the results corroborate the discursive institutionalist expectations regarding systematically 
differing discourse for our sample of six Western European countries.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITIES AND COMPARISON OF DISCOURSES 
ACROSS COUNTRIES 
The basic tenet of the discursive institutionalist literature is that ideational processes help to 
explain both long-term institutional and short-term policy-specific changes (for an overview, 
see Schmidt [2008] or Béland [2009]). In the first step of an empirical application, it is thus 
necessary to trace the ideas that give rise to the actors’ discourse. Subsequently, as a discourse 
becomes routine, the corresponding ideas become enshrined in the institutional setting of a 
country (Blyth 2002). However, the ideas and their carrying institutions often lead to 
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conflicting interpretations, provoke opposition and thus may trigger changes in discourse, 
which, in turn, has the potential to reshape the institutional setting again. Béland (2009: 710) 
calls this process “symbolic and institutional translation”, which involves the enrichment of 
new ideas with given ones inherited from a country’s particular institutional legacy (see also 
Campbell 2004: 80). Therefore, politico-economic institutional complementarities thereby can 
be defined as being connected to a specific discourse, which tends to restrict the spectrum of 
available ideas in political struggles (Pfau-Effinger 2005).2 For example, we would expect a 
discourse highlighting the benefits of flexibility and competitiveness to be more important in 
liberal market economies such as the UK. 
Recognizing the important role that ideas play for institutional change first of all 
implies acknowledging that they are not purely epiphenomenal (see Campbell [2004] for a 
thorough discussion). However, this immediately raises the question of how they can be 
assessed in the first place. This contribution suggests that ideas can be empirically identified 
and systematically compared via an analysis of mass media content. The guiding assumption 
is that political conflicts in today’s established democracies are increasingly carried out in the 
media arena (Vliegenhardt and Walgrave 2008), which is why this study aims to show which 
ideas are introduced and become salient in the mediatized discourse. In fact, only ideas salient 
in the media have the potential to influence both policy-making and public opinion. The 
choice to rely on the mass media is therefore guided by the rationale that other sources such as 
party manifestoes or parliamentary debates may not contain information on all politically 
relevant interests. Actually, actors such as corporations or public administrations – which at 
times are crucially important to understand policy processes – have indeed often been 
neglected in previous studies. 
As a working example, this study explores the role of ideas in mediatized discourse on 
labour market policy-making based on a content analysis of newspaper articles in six Western 
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European countries. The country sample comprises the three biggest European economies, 
France, Germany and the UK, and the three smaller Western European countries of 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria. The fact that these countries are among the most 
often studied cases in the discursive institutionalist literature is advantageous since it provides 
clear benchmarks on what the quantitative analysis in this study should reveal. Beyond 
differences in their economic strength, the six countries differ considerably with respect to 
their historical pathways of economic development. Moreover, the six countries heavily differ 
in terms of the dynamics of the policy processes. By conducting the content analysis from 
2004 to 2006, we can compare the aftermath of radical policy change (reform packages such 
as the ‘Hartz IV’ in Germany, the Wassenaar Agreement in the Netherlands and the ‘New 
Deal’ in the UK), a time of heightened pressure for reforms (the failed flexibilisation of 
employment conditions in France), and two comparatively stable situations with only 
incremental changes (in Switzerland and Austria). However, since we analyse heterogeneous 
countries in terms of their institutional design and the stage of the policy processes, we need 
to make sure that the data we use is actually comparable. 
Most evidently, the analyses need to rely on similar mass media outlets in every 
country. The newspaper sample of the present study includes Le Monde (France), The Times 
(UK), Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), Die Presse 
(Austria) and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland). Quality newspapers were selected since 
they are particularly suited to studying the broader discourse. In fact, they remain the leading 
medium of political coverage, and both report the politically relevant discourse in the most 
detailed manner and influence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news 
organizations (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008). Thus, although the quality press should be 
perceived as part of the elite discourses, it nevertheless provides a differentiated picture of 
which ideas might gain relevance in the broader public sphere (see, e.g. Ferree et al. 2002). Of 
course, although the newspapers chosen are similar in terms of their location in the media 
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market and their journalistic style, the sample still contains heterogeneity. For instance, The 
Times is widely deemed a centre-right outlet, while the Süddeutsche Zeitung in general is 
perceived as centre-left (Strömbäck and Kaid 2008). Hence, specific sampling, coding and 
aggregation strategies have to be applied in order to further minimize media bias. 
First, the selection of documents needs to be designed in such a way that the national 
differences in a specific policy field do not lead to a selection bias. To achieve this aim, the 
policy under scrutiny needs to be defined in a broad way, which ensures that the selection of 
documents is sensitive enough to the peculiarities in behaviours, outcomes, procedures, and 
institutions that emanate from the national labour market policy subsystems. In the following 
study, the relevant events in the labour market policy processes in each country were first 
identified using various yearbooks as well as the annual reviews of the newspapers in our 
sample – see the summary in the online appendix for an overview of the policies coded in the 
content analysis, as well as Kaufman (2004: 45) for an operational definition of labour market 
policies. These lists of events led to an extensive keyword search for relevant documents in 
electronic newspaper archives. In addition, a chronological sample of the same number of 
articles per country was drawn (1200 each). Chronological sampling reflects the frequency 
distribution of relevant articles over time and therefore captures the peaks and troughs in the 
mediatized discourse. 
Second, some of the coding instructions were specifically designed to minimize any 
unintended influence of the journalistic processing of the actor statements: no paid media 
content, op-eds or letters to the editor were considered as data sources; and no explicit 
expressions of opinion by journalists in the editorial articles were included as actor 
statements.  
Third, the collected data need to be aggregated using probability weights. It is 
important to note that data derived from media documents statistically behave like survey data 
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sampled at two levels, i.e. the country and news document levels. The basic assumption that 
there are equal chances for every actor statement to be included in the sample is clearly 
violated because different media outlets report more or less intensely on policies and the 
selected articles contain different numbers of relevant statements. Thus, the original data 
needs to be weighted relative to the total number of statements in the same document as well 
as relative to the overall number of statements in the respective media outlet. 
Following these guidelines, researchers can be confident that the data are not 
decisively distorted by the collection and aggregation procedures. Thus, systematic tests of 
explanations, which highlight the role of institutional legacies for mediatized discourse, 
become possible.  
 
IDENTIFYING PERCEIVED INTERESTS AS POLICY POSITIONS AND IDEAS AS 
FRAMES  
The previous section has discussed how mediatized discourse can be systematically compared 
across different contexts to provide evidence on its connection to institutional differences. 
This section instead focuses on the relationship between perceived interests and the ideas of 
political actors. To define interests, we can go back to Lukes (1974) and Geuss (1981), who 
argue that particular institutional contexts and the material basis predefine political actors’ 
interests. However, the way in which an actor perceives his or her interests can deviate from 
their material or contextual predefinition. Particularly in a framework entailing uncertainty, 
actors cannot be expected to determine what their actual interests are and hence need to rely 
on heuristics and shortcuts to determine their interests. In the end, however, as political 
scientists who engage in content analyses, we are merely able to measure the actors’ 
perceived interests (Hay 2011). More precisely, the political actors’ perceived interests can be 
identified by tracing their policy positions in the mass media. Of course, the discursive actions 
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undertaken by political actors who resort to framing strategies may, in turn, lead to changing 
perceived preferences of concurring actors. Thus, the process of interest-formation and 
interest-communication should be understood as a dynamic political process. 
As for the identification of ideas, we follow Campbell (2002) and Béland (2009), who 
show how the concept of framing can be integrated into ideational approaches of institutional 
change. To conceptualize ideas as frames means to focus on the “central organizing ideas that 
provide coherence to a designated set of idea elements” (Ferree et al. 2002: 105). 
Accordingly, we understand ideas as frames, which are used by political actors to define a 
problem that needs to be solved as well as to disclose what the causal interpretation of this 
problem should be (Entman 1993: 52). In a similar vein, (Béland 2009: 707) argues that 
framing can be regarded as “value amplification”, which means that actors often draw on a 
society’s cultural repertoire in order to construct frames that promote their policy ideas. 
Likewise, it is usually assumed that framing contests are related to underlying paradigmatic 
conflicts, which resonate with the broader cultural and societal context of the mediatized 
discourse and form the basis for the actors’ assumptions and interpretations of the policies at 
stake (Entman 2004: 14). 
 Thus we start from the presumption that the perceived interests of political actors at 
least partly shape their framing. The actors’ perception of interests is hence expected to set 
clear limits to their discursive strategy in terms of the ideas they convey. In fact, once 
committed to a particular definition of what their interests are (or should be), these actors 
need to display continuity in the communication of their ideas to be a credible protagonist in 
the discourse on specific policies. Such consistency is pivotal to ensure their reputation as 
representatives of specific constituencies and their trustworthiness as political allies (Kriesi 
2004). The actors’ framing, and with it the policy interpretations and solutions they propose, 
is thus influenced by political constraints, i.e. the other actors’ attempts to shape the course of 
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the mediatized discourse (Chong and Druckman 2007). In other words, political actors seek to 
legitimize their policy choices by means of frames, which justify their perceived interests in 
order to win over allies and to mobilize the support of the public or particular constituencies 
(Surel 2000; Cox 2001). The communication of these ideas is thus at least partly a strategic 
exercise, and mediatized discourse is shaped by the competition among actors trying to 
overcome the scepticism of other actors and the public to persuade them of their ideas. 
Following this conceptualization, the Core Sentence Analysis (CSA, see Kriesi et al. 
[2012]) can be used to reliably chronicle the actors’ perceived interests and ideas in 
mediatized discourse. More precisely, after selecting a representative set of media documents, 
these can be coded inductively into stylized representations of the actors’ policy positions and 
their framing. Table 1 illustrates the coding procedure: if a policy statement of a relevant actor 
is found in a text segment, this segment is reduced to its essential structure that contains only 
the subject actor, the policy position (reflecting the actors’ perceived interest), and the 
justification of the policy position (reflecting the actors’ framing).3 The two policy statements 
in the example refer to Gordon Brown’s support of public sector restructuring, which he 
underlines by calls ‘to stay disciplined’. These justifications were recoded in a second step as 
justifications related to the idea of austerity. 
 
Table 1 CSA coding example 
    
In his first big speech on the economy since the Budget, the Chancellor will warn 
civil service unions that there will be no going back on his demand for 40,000 job 
cuts, and no return to the days of inflationary wage deals. [...] Mr. Brown is to 
argue that failure to stay disciplined will jeopardise Britain’s hard-won platform  
of economic stability. 
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(The Times, April 21, s, Page 21, ‘Chancellor says more Whitehall jobs to go’) 
    
Actor  Policy statement Position Frame  
    
Gordon Brown job cuts  +  fiscal discipline (austerity)  
Gordon Brown wage moderation +  fiscal discipline (austerity)  
    
 
 
The CSA approach has several useful properties, which can be utilized for discursive 
institutionalist analyses. First, the unit of analysis is located at the propositional level, which 
is why perceived interests can be explored individually for each actor (see Chong and 
Druckman 2007). Second, CSA data are a fine-grained and standardized representation of the 
content, which is why their quality can be assessed internally, i.e. across different coders, and 
externally, i.e. opposite alternative data sources. In a pre-test, six coders obtained a coefficient 
of reliability of 0.77 for coder agreement on the identification of policy statements, which is 
acceptable (see Lombard, Snyder-Dutch and Bracken [2002]). Inter-coder agreement for the 
correct annotation of actors and frames was equally admissible (0.88 and 0.74, respectively). 
Moreover, comparisons of CSA data with data from expert judgments, party manifesto 
coding, and mass surveys suggest that the external validity is given as well (Helbling and 
Tresch 2011). Third, the CSA coding approach is essentially an inductive one. Therefore, the 
policy statements of each article in the selected articles were coded as long as they relate to 
labour market policies. The implication thereof is that all actors and the full range of interests 
and frames are included in the data. The data thus reflect in a valid way which ideas are 
salient for which actor in the six countries during the research period. Among others, our 
country sample will thus provide evidence for the relationship between framing and policy 
processes, since we can compare the mediatized discourse in the aftermath of radical policy 
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changes (in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) to discourses in times of heightened 
reform pressure (in France) and comparatively stable situations (in Switzerland and Austria). 
The coding of our working example yielded over 2512 statements. The resulting 
diversity of the actors present in the data, and the heterogeneity of the single frames brought 
forward in the mediatized discourse on labour market policies, made it reasonable to 
rearrange the actors and frames first into more general categories before comparing them 
across countries (Kriesi et al. 2012). Hence, the classification of actors first distinguishes 
public authority actors, i.e. national executives, public administrations, EU actors, 
intergovernmental organization (IGO) actors, and foreign governments. All these actors 
somehow have a legitimate responsibility to provide public goods or to regulate economic 
markets. Next, we distinguish intermediary actors (i.e. parties and interest groups), who 
aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate them into political claims. The 
statements of parties are grouped into the categories communists/ socialists, greens, social 
democrats, Christian democrats/conservatives, liberal parties and populist right parties. The 
statements of interest groups are aggregated into the categories trade unions, public interest 
groups, white-collar professional organizations, small business organizations, think tanks, and 
peak employer organizations. Finally, many business actors engaging in mediatized discourse 
on labour market policies were found. We classified them into global corporations (defined as 
corporations listed in the Forbes ranking of the world’s 2000 biggest companies), public 
enterprises and niche firms (which are neither big multinational corporations nor publicly 
owned ones).  
Similarly to the actors, the frames coded featured a high heterogeneity in terms of their 
degree of abstraction and informative value (see a summary in the online appendix). 
Accordingly, a general set of initial categories was developed to which the inductively coded 
frames could be allocated. To begin with, a large part of the justifications was found to centre 
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on the antagonism between social protection and productivity. Essentially, this antagonism 
revolves around whether the unemployed and welfare recipients are perceived as being lazy 
and need work requirements, means-tested benefits and activating incentives, or whether they 
are perceived as suffering from structural hardship that entitles them to rely on solidarity and 
de-commodification (see van Oorschot 2000, Ross 2000b: 178). A second cluster of 
justifications focused on the question of whether state intervention is understood as a problem 
(austerity frames) or the solution (regulation frames) to challenges stemming from structural 
changes such as demographic shifts, sluggish growth or deindustrialization (see Pierson 
2001). Austerity frames express scepticism toward state provision and support of market-
based approaches to social problems. Regulation frames, in contrast, comprise arguments 
emphasizing the state’s obligation to intervene in labour markets and provide legislation in 
response to changing demands. Two further types of frames centred on the question of 
national economic competitiveness: many policy positions were justified in the light of the 
need to promote business for the world markets, or to protect parts of the national economy 
from the vagaries of global markets (see Rodrik 2006). Finally, a last set of frames focuses on 
social investment (Fossati and Häusermann forthcoming). These frames highlight aspects of 
labour market reforms such as human capital training, consumer rights, and ecological 
aspects, as well as investments in individual quality of life. 
To conclude, CSA is a versatile instrument able to capture the full complexity of 
mediatized discourse without taking risks in terms of reliability and reproducibility. In the 
following section, we apply systematic statistical methods to show how explanations brought 
forward in the literature to explain the relationship among institutional legacies, perceived 
interests and the communication of frames in the media arena can be generalized.  
 
THE STRUCTURE OF MEDIATIZE DISCOURSE ON LABOR MARKET POLICIES 
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Our working example is labour market policy discourse. The most basic question of 
how discourse on labour market policies is structured into underlying dimensions is answered 
by performing a factor analysis on the actors’ policy positions – i.e. their perceived interests 
in labour market liberalization – and their emphasis of the seven-frame cluster as defined in 
the previous section – i.e. social protection, productivity, austerity, regulation, economic 
promotion, protection and social investment frames. In substantial terms, this analysis 
establishes the grid that underlies mediatized discourse. It can show which frames are similar 
in terms of the actors’ interests regarding the justifications they use to support or oppose 
liberalizing labour market reforms. As for the calculation, the policy positions of the 87 actors 
in the data set were first multiplied by the frequency by which particular frames were used 
(hereafter frame emphasis). In a second step, the number of factors was assessed by 
performing an eigenvalue test (results shown in Figure A1 in the online appendix), which 
indicates a three-factor solution as an optimal representation of the structure of mediatized 
discourse in this policy domain (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Factor analysis of frame-related policy positions and frame emphasis 
 Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  
Regulation  0.32 -0.07 -0.05 
Social protection  0.51 0.15 0.30 
Social investment  0.41 -0.24 0.39 
 Productivity  0.49 0.33 0.09 
Austerity  -0.09 0.61 0.16 
Economic promotion 0.08 0.40 -0.12 
Protection  0.03 0.03 0.61 
Eigenvalues  1.75 1.38 1.09   
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Variance explained  0.11 0.10 0.10 
N  87 87 87 
Label  Corporatist Neoliberal Compensation 
 
Note: Maximum-likelihood factor analysis, variamax rotated.  
 
 
As shown in Table 2, productivity, regulation, social protection and social investment 
substantially load on the first factor.4 Productivity has a factor loading of 0.49, regulation 
loads with 0.32, and social protection and social investment have values of 0.51 and 0.41, 
respectively. This dimension therefore combines arguments regarding the need of labour 
market policies to be market conforming, but with a commitment to state intervention, social 
safety and sustainable development. These ideas highlight an economic growth strategy that is 
firmly embedded into state regulation and emphasizes socially sound progress, and thus most 
closely follows the ideas of corporatist development as it is deeply rooted in continental 
Western European politics (see Schmidt [2002b]; Hays 2009).  
While regulation exclusively loads on the first factor, the other frame categories also 
contribute to other factors. Productivity, to begin with, additionally loads on the second factor 
(loading of 0.33), which is built around the austerity frame (loading of 0.61) and also includes 
arguments regarding economic promotion (loading of 0.40). This dimension stands, on the 
one hand, for the argument that the public sector (and state regulation in general) creates 
problems such as excessive public debt and therefore needs retrenchment. On the other hand, 
the need to help business in becoming competitive on world markets (economic promotion) is 
an important aspect of this labour market policy framing. In sum, these ideas should best be 
attributed to the global diffusion of neoliberalism during the last two decades (Simmons, 
Dobbin and Garrett 2006), which results in continuous pressures for budgetary rigor, 
deregulation and business-friendly incentives.  
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Social protection and social investment, by contrast, associate with the protectionist 
frames of a third factor. Protection loads on this factor to a high degree (loading of 0.61), 
while social protection frames (loading of 0.30) and social investment arguments (loading of 
0.39) are contributing less but still substantially to this factor. As for the other dimensions of 
the labour market policy framing, this factor is clearly reflected in the literature as well. 
Historically, labour market liberalization in Western Europe only was politically sustainable if 
coupled with an extension of the welfare states or the selective protection of specific 
economic sectors from international competition (Katzenstein 1985). Thus, particularly in the 
context of globalized labour markets that increase the risks for workers, these frames reflect 
demands for compensation, in either a welfare or territorial sense. 
 
POLITICS, INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES, AND THE FRAMING OF LABOUR 
MAREKT POLICIES  
The previous section has established that three dimensions of labour market policy discourse 
– which resonate well with the comparative political economy literature – are empirically 
identifiable in Western Europe. The following analysis builds upon these results and sheds 
light on possible correlates to their frame emphasis. As already mentioned, the interplay 
between institutions and politics is highlighted in the literature as crucial to the understanding 
of discursive processes. Hence, we can explore how the frame dimensions are used in 
dependence on the actor categories and the countries included in our sample. Accordingly, for 
the following estimations, the relative frequency is calculated as the sum of the frames that 
are substantially correlated with a particular dimension in the last section weighted by their 
factor loading. Table 3 reports on the results of an ordinary least squares regression on the 
actors’ and countries’ relative emphasis of corporatism, neoliberalism, and compensation. For 
both the country and actor categories, the category with the lowest relative emphasis of the 
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respective dimension was chosen as the reference. Significant deviances from the reference 
category therefore show whether actors or countries are using a specific frame dimension 
significantly more often. 
 
Table 3 OLS regression results of actor types and countries on the emphasis of the three 
dimensions of public discourse on labour market policiesa 
	
Corporatist frames Neoliberal frames Compensation frames 
	
Estimat
es 
Std. 
Error 
Pr 
(>|t|) 
Estima
tes 
Std. 
Error 
Pr 
(>|t|) 
Estim
ates 
Std. 
Error 
Pr 
(>|t|) 
National executives  0.042 0.081 
	
0.156 0.066 *  0.134 0.074 .  
Public administrations  0.154 0.081 .  0.168 0.066 *  0.056 0.074 
	EU actors  0.157 0.088 .  0.050 0.072 
	
0.109 0.079 
	IGO actors  0.153 0.106 
	
0.264 0.09 **  -- reference -- 
Foreign governments  0.009 0.083 
	
0.033 0.068 
	
0.288 0.077 ***  
Communists/left socialists  0.194 0.087 *  -- reference -- 0.232 0.079 **  
Green parties  0.271 0.135 *  0.070 0.115 
	
0.140 0.113 
	Social democratic parties  0.152 0.089 .  0.081 0.073 
	
0.137 0.079 .  
Christ. dem./Conservatives  0.097 0.084 
	
0.163 0.069 *  0.111 0.076 
	Liberal parties  0.116 0.105 
	
0.106 0.088 
	
0.160 0.091 .  
Populist right parties  -- reference -- 0.176 0.077 *  0.150 0.083 .  
Trade unions  0.107 0.081 
	
0.033 0.066 
	
0.197 0.074 *  
Public interest groups  0.034 0.081 
	
0.096 0.066 
	
0.161 0.074 *  
White-collar prof. org. 0.209 0.089 *  0.027 0.073 
	
0.091 0.079 
	Small bus. organisations  0.018 0.088 
	
0.040 0.072 
	
0.225 0.078 **  
Think tanks  0.064 0.088 
	
0.109 0.072 
	
0.196 0.079 *  
Peak empl. organisations  0.006 0.081 
	
0.285 0.066 ***  0.035 0.074 
	Global corporations  0.095 0.081 
	
0.247 0.066 ***  0.036 0.074 
	Niche firms  0.128 0.081 
	
0.174 0.066 *  0.073 0.074 
	Public enterprises  0.207 0.095 *  0.193 0.078 *  0.021 0.084 
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Austria  0.140 0.046 **  0.063 0.039 
	
0.016 0.036 
	France  0.120 0.044 **  -- reference -- 0.067 0.034 .  
Germany  0.174 0.046 ***  0.038 0.04 
	
0.033 0.036 
	Netherlands  0.064 0.042 
	
0.025 0.036 
	
0.051 0.033 
	Switzerland  0.045 0.045 
	
0.060 0.038 
	
0.059 0.035 
	UK  -- reference -- 0.152 0.039 ***  -- reference -- 
(Intercept)  0.196 0.075 *  -0.010 0.055 
	
-0.003 0.070 
	N  87 87 
	
87 
	R-squared  0.45 0.56 
	
0.53 
	F-statistic  2.08 (24/62 DF) * 3.30 (24/62 DF) *** 2.92 (24/62 DF) *** 
Note: P-values: p ≤ 0.001=***, p ≤ 0.01=**, p ≤ 0.05=*, p ≤ 0.1=.  
a Unstandardised coefficients, standard errors and levels of significance. 
 
The intercepts indicate that corporatist frames are by far the most frequently used 
ideas irrespective of the differences among actors and countries. The values of the R-squared 
(0.45, 0.56 and 0.53) as well as the significant F-statistic for all three models imply that the 
actors’ perceived preferences and country differences are substantially correlated with the 
variation of all frame dimensions. These findings can thus be interpreted as general evidence 
that institutional complementarities and politics play a substantial role in explaining 
differences in mediatized discourse. 
As for corporatist frames, it becomes evident that especially left actors and public 
authorities or enterprises have a substantially stronger preference to use them than the populist 
right parties (reference category). In terms of the classification used in this study, ‘old’ left 
actors (social democrats, communist and radical socialist parties, and trade unions) as well as 
‘new’ left actors (greens and public interest groups) are counted as part of the political left. 
Three of these five actors, i.e. the social democratic parties, communist and radical socialist 
parties, and greens, show an at least 15% higher propensity to employ corporatist arguments 
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in the labour market policy discourse. The same holds for the public administrations, EU 
actors and public enterprises as well as for the white-collar professional organizations, but not 
for actors clearly attributable to the political right (most notably the liberal, Christian 
democratic/conservative and populist right parties, the peak employers’ associations, as well 
as global corporations). There is thus a consensus among some public actors and all actors 
from the left that economic growth needs state regulation and social stabilization. This does 
not hold for the most important public authority actor, the national executives. Moreover, as 
will be discussed below, public authorities and enterprises show a disproportionally frequent 
usage of neoliberal frames, which of course sets corporatist arguments off to a large extent. 
Neoliberal frames, instead, are not emphasized by the representatives of the EU in the 
national mediatized discourses. This is remarkable, since the EU is often blamed for pushing 
for a deepening and deregulation of the European Single Market (see, e.g. Thatcher [2006]). 
EU actors, in contrast, seem to give slight support to the eco-social market model with regard 
to their framing strategy, which could originate from the flexicurity model they proposed in 
the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.  
A phalanx of right-wing, business, and public authority actors with a high usage of 
neoliberal frames can be identified. This result is clearest for the peak employers’ 
associations, IGO actors and global corporations who show a 28.5%, 26.4% and 24.7% higher 
emphasis of neoliberal frames than the communists and left socialists. National executives, 
public administrations, Christian democrats/conservatives, populist right parties, niche firms 
and public enterprises are also characterized by a significantly stronger preference for 
deregulation, budgetary rigor and business-friendly incentives than the far left. While this is 
not surprising, it could also have been expected for the liberal parties and the EU actors. The 
former, however, use compensation frames slightly more often. The latter, as already outlined, 
are only employing corporatist frames relatively often.  
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The results for the compensation frames confirm that a ‘packaging of policies’ in 
Western European welfare politics should increasingly be anticipated (see Häusermann 2010). 
Due to the pressure for more flexible and transnational labour markets, demand for socially 
and nationally protective policy solutions is expected to on both sides of the political 
spectrum (Oesch 2008). The results indeed support the view that traditionally protectionist 
right actors such as the small business associations and the radical populist parties (see 
Katzenstein [1985]) are showing the same frame emphasis as left actors (communists and left 
socialists, social democrats, trade unions and public interest groups). Among these actors, 
communists and left socialists (23.2%) and small business associations (22.5%) have the 
strongest increase in compensation frames compared to the IGO actors, whose least frequent 
usage of social and territorial protection arguments is also understandable. Beyond that, 
foreign governments are most insistent with compensation arguments (28.8%). Thus, they 
intervene in the national discourse mainly to call for the sheltering of the economically 
vulnerable parts of the workforce. Further frequent users of compensation frames are national 
executives and think tanks.  
As far as the actors are concerned, their framing strategies thus largely resonate with 
their perceived interests in mediatized discourse on labour market policies. However, there 
are also clear patterns with respect to the frame usage across countries. The regression results 
in Table 3 can thereby be deepened by displaying the predicted probability distribution by 
countries (Figure 1) as well as key figures of the societal and economic development in which 
mediatizes discourse is embedded (Table 4). To begin with, similarly to policy positions, 
which systematically vary according to differences in coordination patterns between countries 
(see Wueest [2013]), the communication of frames seems to be at least partly shaped by the 
institutional legacies of countries, too. This becomes most clear in the exceptional framing 
pattern found for the UK. The only ‘liberal’ market economy – according to Hall and 
Soskice’s (2001) influential definition of the two varieties of capitalism – shows by far the 
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lowest usage of corporatist and compensation frames. This is not surprising since in the UK, 
economic players are coordinated by more competitive and hierarchical market arrangements 
(Thatcher 2006), which is in line with the lower propensity to employ corporatist and 
compensation frames. In contrast, the UK stands out as far as the intensity of neoliberal 
framing is concerned. Ceteris paribus, actors in the UK are 15.2% more likely to rely on 
neoliberal arguments than in France (see Table 3). Ross (2000a: 183) holds that, in addition to 
the market-oriented politico-economic institutional setting, the two-party system and the 
enfeeblement of the trade unions have increased the impact of neoliberal ideas in the UK. The 
framing among the other countries varies less than in comparison with the UK. These 
‘coordinated’ market economies (see Hall and Soskice, 2001) share similar patterns of the 
coordination of economic activities, which are less based on market-oriented mechanisms, as 
the OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index shows.5 The EPL index measures 
the extent to which a firms’ ability to fire their workers is constrained by collective 
agreements or national legislation. Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland clearly have less flexible labour markets than the UK. In these coordinated 
institutional systems, state officials first of all need to seek agreements among business and 
labour officials when reforms are at stake (Béland 2009: 710). This social partnership favours 
a ‘coordinative discourse’ (Schmidt 2002a) and, correspondingly, the usage of corporatist 
frames. With a 6.7% higher usage of compensation frames, the labour market policy discourse 
in France is more solidly grounded in a discourse of social rights and national protection than 
in the other countries. Although this difference distinguishes France only weakly, it resonates 
with the high polarization of welfare politics – especially the high militancy of the trade 
unions (see Ross 2000a: 180) – and the powerful role of the state in economic policy-making. 
Thus, the results are in line with the institutionalist diagnosis of France as a ‘state-influenced’ 
(Schmidt 2009), ‘entrepreneurial’ (Thibergien 2007), or ‘centralized’ market economy 
(Fioretos 2011). Decision-making and implementation processes in France are characterized 
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by a higher degree of centralization, and hence modernization strategies have traditionally 
relied on major industrial projects involving far-reaching state intervention (Baccaro and 
Simoni 2008). This increases the usage of compensation-related arguments since nationally 
oriented businesses have more leverage in the political process.  
 
Figure 1 Frame emphasis and policy positions by country 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities derived from regressions as shown in Table 3.  
 
Figure 2 Actor positions towards labour market liberalisation 
 
 
In sum, there is indication of a systematic relationship between different institutional 
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0.2
0
0.4
France Germany Netherlands UK
Neoliberalist frames Compensation framesCorporatist frames
0.6
SwitzerlandAustria
0.2
0
0.4
France Germany Netherlands UK
0.6
SwitzerlandAustria
0.2
0
0.4
France Germany Netherlands UK
0.6
SwitzerlandAustria
-1
.0
France Germany Netherlands UKSwitzerlandAustria
-0
.5
0
0.
5
1.
0
Governments Peak	employer	associations Trade	unions
Main	partisan	actor:	Radical	populist	right	parties	in	Austria	and	Switzerland,
						Social	Democrats	in	France	and	Germany,	Socialist	populists	in	the	Nether-
						lands,	Conservatives	in	the	UK.
 22 
However, as the considerable variation of the framing patterns among the coordinated market 
economies in our sample shows, this does not seem to be the full story (see Figure 1). For 
instance, it is not obvious why Germany and Austria should exhibit a significantly higher 
emphasis on corporatist frames and substantially lower use of compensation frames than the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The latter two countries arguably are usually described as being 
similar to Germany and Austria (see, e.g. Schnyder and Heemskerk [2008]). Hence, besides 
institutional reasons, political constellations may provide additional insights into why the 
frames are unevenly distributed across the coordinated market economies. CSA data have the 
advantage that they can be disaggregated and explored to analyse the policy positions of all 
actors (see Figure 2). These range from decisive opposition (-1) to strong support (+1) for 
labour market liberalization reforms. We show the positions of countries for all actors (as box 
plots) as well as for four key actors in the mediatized discourse: governments, the most 
important party actor, trade unions and peak employer associations.  
In Austria, despite the median policy position being clearly pro-liberalization, three of 
the four major actors actually oppose labour market liberalization. The coalition government 
of the centre-right Austrian People’s Party and the populist right Freedom Party of Austria as 
well as the trade unions is clearly speaking out against liberalization reforms. The usually 
very strong Social Democratic Party of Austria, in contrast, was not able to play an important 
role in the mediatized discourse from 2003 to 2006. The fact that there is a comparatively 
high share of corporatist and neoliberal frames in Austria (see Figure 1) might thus be related 
to the dominance of politically right actors as well as to the overall quite liberalization- 
friendly policy context. The situation in Austria could therefore be interpreted as an 
expression of ‘the social construction of the need to reform’ (Cox 2001: 475), i.e. a perceived 
urgency of the majority of actors that reform efforts are indeed necessary. 
 23 
In a similar vein, the conservative government led by Sarkozy and the peak employer 
associations take an ambivalent stance toward labour market reforms in France. However, the 
reluctance of the political right in France to endorse labour market liberalization is situated in 
an overall quite liberalization-sceptical context, which might well be connected to the high 
share of compensation frames and low share of neoliberal frames, respectively. In Germany, 
the Social Democrats were in government during the research period – until 2005 as leading 
and later as junior partner – and pushed for their Agenda 2010 liberalization reforms. Since 
they also dominate the mediatized discourse in terms of party politics and framed their reform 
proposals as a rescue of the traditional social market model, compensation frames are used 
less and neoliberal frames are used more in Germany. 
In the Netherlands, a quite consistent group of moderately pro-liberalization actors 
(the government, peak employer associations and trade unions) is challenged by the populist 
left Socialist Party, which fiercely opposes labour market reforms. In a similar vein, we find a 
quite homogenous group in Switzerland (the government, the right-wing populist Swiss 
People’s Party and the peak employer associations), which faces radical trade unions. In such 
a polarized situation, the importance of compensation frames could be interpreted as an 
appeasement strategy of the dominant political actors toward their political counterparts. In 
the UK, finally, we identify moderate trade unions and a radically pro-liberalization partisan 
actor – the Conservatives. Together with the slightly supportive Labour government, the main 
policy interests endorse liberalizing labour market reforms. This can be related to the framing, 
since – as already outlined – the UK can be distinguished from the other countries by its 
starkly neoliberal discourse. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The main aim of this contribution was to answer the repeated calls for a departure from the 
typical case study design in discursive institutionalist studies. More precisely, we suggested a 
quantitative content analysis approach to complement the growing qualitative research on 
discursive institutionalism. This framework allows empirical mapping of discourse in a highly 
systematic way using mass media content analysis. A particular strength of this approach is 
the possibility to generate detailed and versatile data, which can be adapted to the specific 
needs of research projects without losing their comparability across single countries, policy 
realms, and longer time periods. Furthermore, the data generation process is transparent and 
its reliability can be put under scientific scrutiny. 
The working example of the labour market policy discourse in six Western European 
countries has revealed that the approach is valid in the sense that we find results 
corresponding to the well-established comparative political economy literature. A first 
analysis showed that three dimensions structure the framing of labour market policies, 
namely, corporatism, neoliberalism and compensation. As compared to previous 
contributions, however, we are able to map the composition of these ideas in greater detail. 
The first and strongest dimension, which was identified as the corporatist dimension, 
highlights an economic growth strategy, which is firmly embedded into state regulation and 
socially sustainable development. The second dimension can be attributed to the global 
diffusion of neoliberal ideas, summarizing arguments on the need for budgetary rigor and 
deregulation in general. The frames of the third dimension refer to demands for social or 
territorial protection, reflecting the need to cushion labour market deregulation with promises 
to extend the welfare state or to selectively protect specific economic sectors from 
international competition. These major ideas and the illustration of their composition could be 
inductively derived from the many single statements placed in the mediatized discourse of the 
six countries by a multitude of different political actors. 
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Moreover, it could be demonstrated that political constellations and the institutional 
legacies also are related to the framing of labour market policies. The empirical analyses show 
that politically right as well as public authority actors are pursuing neoliberal frames. Despite 
several studies on centre-right and centre-left party convergence on economic issues (e.g. 
Kriesi et al. 2008), mainstream left parties show a distinct frame emphasis. They prefer to rely 
on corporatist and compensation frames. Likewise, the findings showed that the international 
diffusion of neoliberal ideas from the 1980s on has not led to a hegemonic neoliberal 
discourse in Western Europe (e.g. van Apeldoorn 2002). The decade-old ideas related to 
corporatism and demands for compensation still appear very prominently in the mediatized 
discourse. Liberal market systems such as the UK clearly foster the domination of a 
‘communicative discourse’ (Schmidt 2002a), which leads to a decrease of corporatist frames 
and an increase of a neoliberal framing aimed at convincing the public opinion to support 
deregulation reforms. The discourse in continental Western European countries, by contrast, 
is shaped by corporatist frames, which reflects a preference for a ‘coordinative discourse’ 
(Schmidt 2002a). In the latter group of countries, the discourse in France additionally stands 
out by a higher emphasis on arguments related to state protections from the vagaries of free 
markets.  
 
Biographical notes: Bruno Wueest is postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political 
Science and National Center for Competence in Research on Democracy, University of 
Zurich. Flavia Fossati is postdoctoral researcher at the Swiss Graduate School of Public 
Administration and National Center for Competence on Research on Migration at the 
University of Lausanne and at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich. 
Address for correspondence: Bruno Wueest, Department of Political, University of Zurich, 
Switzerland. Email: wueest@ipz.uzh.ch/ Flavia Fossati, Swiss Graduate School of Public 
 26 
Administration, University of Lausanne and Department of Political Science, University of 
Zurich, Switzerland. Email flavia.fossati@unil.ch. 
 
 
AKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Research for this article was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation project 
number 111756. 
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of EJPP, Silja Häusermann, Fabrizio 
Gilardi, Hanna Schwander, Livia Schubiger, Klaus Armingeon, and Dominic Geering for very 
helpful comments on previous versions of this article. 
 
 
NOTES 
1 Following Schmidt (2008) and Campbell and Pedersen (2001), we use ‘discursive institutionalism’, which is 
the most common term. However, other terms such as ideational or constructivist institutionalism (see Hay 2001 
and 2006) are used as well to denote very similar theoretical perspectives. 
 
2 In other words, it is possible to study discourse both as causing policy processes and as contingent on the 
institutional context. For the following quantitative analysis, we simply assume that discourse and institutions 
are systematically related to each other without implying specific causal mechanisms.  
 
3 Since actors regularly back their policy positions in mediatized discourses with multiple justifications (see 
Lerch and Schwellnus [2006: 307]), the coding of multiple frames per core sentence was allowed. 
 
4 In line with the recommendations by the literature, we define a factor loading of 0.32 or higher as a minimum 
threshold for the inclusion of a variable in a factor (see Costello and Osborne [2005: 4]).  
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5 Average EPL index values from 1990 to 2008: France=2.80, Germany=2.52, Netherlands=2.34, Austria=2.04, 
Switzerland=1.06, UK=0.59 (Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/, [13.08.2013]). 
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